An internal market for Security and Defence

The Kangaroo Group

The first direct election to the European Parliament took place in 1979. At that time the ideas of what the role of this newly elected institution should be varied widely. A large group of MEPs viewed the Parliament as a constituent assembly and felt that the implementation of a European Constitution should have priority. Another group of MEPs held the view that the first aim should be to prove that the Parliament was able to create clear advantages for the citizens of Europe. This is where I met Dieter Rogalla. He wholeheartedly espoused the abolition of superfluous border controls between Member States of the European Union.

Living in the border region between the Black Forest and the Vosges, I had been pursuing the same goal. It was the most important message of my election campaign. In my previous career I had made the rule for myself that I would only invest my time in projects which had a more than 50 per cent chance of success. In my view, the project of a European Constitution did not meet this criterion at that time. Also, I was 38 years old and felt that drawing up a Constitution was a task for grey-haired men with long years of political experience. I considered the abolition of border controls between Member States to be the most important and also most realistic project for Europe at this point in time. From this idea sprang an initially quite informal group, established by myself, the British Conservative Basil de Ferranti and the German Social Democrat Dieter Rogalla.

At first this went under the not exactly attractive name of “working group for the abolition of technical barriers to trade”. However, we stood in direct competition to the “Crocodile Club”, an association founded by Altiero Spinelli, which pursued the aim of creating a European Constitution. In search of an even more appealing animal name, Dieter Rogalla suggested the Kangaroo, which, even with an empty pouch, is able to make great leaps forward. Given the fact that the coffers were, in fact, empty at that time, this was an important point.

The goal of abolishing border controls was achieved in 1992 with the single market programme and the Schengen Agreement. The next big project for the Kangaroo Group was the single currency. Our most important aim was to create the necessary preconditions for a stable European currency, which depended on two factors: on the one hand, the independence and stability orientation of the European Central Bank, and on the other, a functioning debt brake for the Member States. The independence and stability orientation of the Central Bank were achieved, but sadly the debt brake in the guise of the Maastricht criteria has not had sufficient effect.

Despite this, a study published in “Die Welt” ¹ ten years after the introduction of the single currency showed that since the introduction of the Euro, the inflation rate has been lower (1.5 per cent per year) than that of the German Mark (2.6 per cent per year) during the time of its existence. However, the touchstone for the Euro’s success will be when the economy recovers after the crisis, and the European Central Bank has to raise the interest rates to preserve monetary stability. Even back then we believed that for a monetary union to achieve long-term success it had to be part and parcel of a political union. Herein lies, in my view, the biggest weakness of the European currency system. We succeeded in creating a comprehensive monetary union, but only the rudiments of a political union were realised.

A political union requires a common foreign, security and defence policy. Opinion polls have shown that this is what citizens actually expect from the European Union: a life in peace and security. It is for this reason that the Kangaroo Group set up a working group for security and defence in 1999. Since then, in many discussions on the subject of security in Europe, I have repeatedly heard questions such as: “Who do we actually want to defend ourselves against?”, and: “Is a defence policy still necessary in today’s world?” This question was also posed by Francis Fukuyama in an article written immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union². But many people fail to take into account that while there has been peace between the Member States of the European Union since 1945, there have been more than 200 wars in other parts of the world, which have killed millions of men, women and children.³ The European Security Strategy, ratified by the European Council in 2003 and revised in 2008, analyses the threats we face today, as well as the values and interests of the European Union and its citizens.

This analysis begins with the dangers of international terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and the potential risk that chemical, biological or nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of terrorists or irresponsible states. A further security hazard is civil war amongst our near neighbours with direct consequences for the European Union. In addition to that there are natural disasters, such as those in Japan and Haiti, which necessitate common action. A European security policy also involves the protection of the outer borders of the Union against trade in drugs, weapons and people. Our energy supply and our trade routes also need to be secured. New threats are arising in the shape of attacks on our computer networks. The fact that our economy and our entire sustenance depend on these networks also constitutes a considerable risk.

Another frequently asked question is why security and defence should be a concern of the European Union. When, in the spring of 1993, I heard about the massacre in Srebrenica, just like many of my colleagues in the European Parliament I was ashamed that Europe, which seemed to be so powerful, had been unable to prevent this bloodshed. In that situation, where all the other means had failed, the only possible response was the intervention of armed forces. However, the European Union had no means of taking such action at the time. In the end, it was our American allies who solved the problem for us, while the Nation States of Europe had failed.

That was when many of us realized that security and defence inevitably had to be responsibilities of the European Union. The European Union should be able to secure peace and to prevent genocide and crimes against humanity at least in its direct vicinity.

Even today we have to ask ourselves why the security problems of the European Union, with its 500 million citizens and a Gross National Product of over 10,000 billion euro, have to be solved by 300 million Americans with an economic output of the same order of magnitude.

What has happened so far?

The first decision preparing for a European Security and Defence Policy came about in an unusual configuration. Traditionally it had been France and Germany who had developed European initiatives together. In St. Malo in 1998, it was France and the United Kingdom who called for a European identity in security matters.

This led to the decisions of the European Council in Cologne and Helsinki to make available to the European Union military forces of up to 60,000 persons for crisis management.

This was the basis on which Javier Solana, then High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, developed the European Union’s Security Strategy which is still valid today.

This document begins with the statement that no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own and that as a union of states producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product the European Union should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and building a better world. Further, it states that 45 million people die every year of hunger and malnutrition, and that security is a precondition of development. The most important characteristics of the European Security Strategy are its comprehensive approach, the close cooperation of civilian and military instruments of crisis management, and the aim of a world order based on an effective multilateral system in the framework of the Charter of the United Nations. This was Europe’s answer to the United States’ strategy back then, which emphasised first and foremost the so-called coalitions of the willing. Today, more than twenty civilian and military interventions have been carried out based on these decisions. To make such interventions possible, the necessary structures had to be put in place. During the initial years, it was principally Javier Solana, as Secretary General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who lent a face to this new field of European politics. The European Parliament instituted a Subcommittee on Security and Defence which I chaired with the goal to provide a parliamentary scrutiny in cooperation with my counterparts of the Parliaments of the Member States. The creation of the European External Action Service, based on the Treaty of Lisbon, has provided a new instrument for the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy led by Baroness Ashton. The list of tasks indicates the comprehensive approach of the European Unions Defence and Security Policy. It includes joint disarmament measures, humanitarian aid and crisis response, military advice and support, conflict prevention and peacekeeping, as well as combat missions in the context of crisis management.

Operations undertaken in the name of the European Security and Defence Policy demonstrate the whole spectrum of security policy responsibilities, ranging from rule of law and observer missions to the deployment of armed forces under the leadership of the European Union.

In Kosovo it is NATO which takes military responsibility. The European Union’s contribution does not consist in the deployment of troops, but in promoting the introduction of the rule of law, especially by training police and setting up an independent judiciary. A further example of the European Union’s help is the training of security personnel in Afghanistan.

A good example of the combination of different mechanisms of security policy was the European Union’s response to the crisis in Georgia in August 2008. On the one hand there was the diplomatic work of the President of Council, Nicolas Sarkozy, in Tiflis and Moscow, which led to a ceasefire, and on the other, the deployment of 300 observers in the crisis region. Their task is to analyse the situation, monitor the return of refugees, and to contribute to easing tension and stabilizing relations between the conflicting parties.

Nevertheless, this also showed the limits of the European Union’s capacities. The deployment of observers was only possible by using available resources outside of their normal scope; and during a visit to Georgia I noticed that protective gear, armoured vehicles, and even binoculars were in short supply. These are not exactly ideal preconditions for an observation mission. It may be an idea for the future to create a pool of basic equipment, which can be used at any time for missions of this kind.

Examples of the involvement of armed forces under the European Union’s Security and Defence Policy are the missions in the Congo, in Chad and in the Gulf of Aden.

In the Congo, armed forces were deployed under the leadership of the European Union, at the request of the United Nations, in order to monitor the elections. It was a clearly defined mission with a definite end date, and it was carried out successfully. A very explosive situation - an attack by governmental troops on the leader of the opposition - was defused by the intervention of the European armed forces.

Since December 2008 European Union ships have been patrolling the Gulf of Aden as part of Operation Atalanta, to deter and disrupt piracy in the region and protect the European Union’s trade routes. Despite these efforts, Somalian pirates detained 31 ships with more than 700 sailors in January 2011.

The European Union’s involvement in Chad from January 2008 to March 2009 aimed to protect the refugee and displaced persons’ camps along the border with the Sudan, which were constantly attacked by mounted militias from Darfur.

During the mission in Chad, it happened for the first time that a soldier was killed on duty in an operation of the European Union. He was sergeant Gilles Polin, 28 years old. At the memorial service in Bayonne, the European Union was represented by Javier Solana and myself, France by Nicolas Sarkozy, Hervé Morin and Michèle Alliot-Marie. The salute for the fallen soldier by his regiment left a lasting impression on me.

What of the future?

Inspections of armed forces under the leadership of the European Union regularly reveal how variable the quality of equipment between different national contingents is.

We should bear in mind that the 27 Member States of the European Union spend around 200 billion euro per year on defence, almost half of the defence expenditure of the United States. Nevertheless, after the Balkan wars our American friends told us that the efficiency of our contribution lay somewhere between 10 and 20 per cent.

In view of the fact that the international financial crisis added strong pressure on national defence budgets, we should consider how closer cooperation could improve the situation.

To start with, it is clear that both civilian and military interventions often require the same resources. Intelligence, telecommunication and navigation, as well as air, sea and land transportation are vital not only for military missions but also for interventions after a tsunami. We must therefore assess where existing cooperation can be strengthened and whether the European Union’s budget could make a contribution.

Budgeting and information are the fundamental means of control which a parliament has at its disposal. The European Parliament has used these options to the best of its abilities. The regular intelligence visits to the crisis regions in the Balkans, the Congo, Chad and Somalia were the most important part of this. They enabled the European Parliament to give an opinion before decisions on the use of armed forces were taken by the Council.

This experience also prompts me to contradict those who consider parliamentary control of defence policy as fundamentally problematic, because parliaments move too slowly. As far as the European Parliament is concerned, I can say from experience that we had the time to deliberate and to vote on a well considered resolution before the Council took a final decision on any of the military interventions of the European Union so far.

Besides, the control lies with the parliaments of the Member States. It is now a matter of developing new forms of collaboration between the parliaments of the Member States and the European Parliament in the field of security and defence.

Outlook

The strongest argument for the further development of the European Security and Defence Policy is the empty coffers of the Member States. We can no longer afford to reinvent the wheel once, let alone twenty-seven times.

In my view, the recent initiative of the European Defence Agency offers a realistic approach. The idea is that Member States first examine in which areas they want to have resources at their own exclusive disposal, and in which areas they are prepared to collaborate or relinquish their own capabilities.

This could bring about new joint initiatives, whereby it would be recommendable to concentrate on projects of a size beyond the means of individual Member States. In addition, we should investigate further options for shared use of resources and for savings through joint technical standards and certifications.

Those countries which house multinational troops such as the Eurocorps should consider placing these units at the permanent disposal of the European Union, eventually in the context of a permanent structured cooperation.

What we need now is a wider public debate on these issues. We must review existing structures and capabilities to see whether they meet the demands of the 21^st century.

Whether or not this will one day lead to a European army is a question of political will. It is therefore, above all, a question to be put to the citizens of the European Union.