"Common answers to common challenges"- Interview with Karl von Wogau

What are your vision and your assessment of the threats facing your country? And Europe?

Since the end of the Cold War, the threats against Europe have fundamentally changed. Terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failed states, and organized crime are nowadays the most important threats posed to the Union and its citizens. In addition, there are the dependency of our energy supply, natural disasters, and the securing of our external borders. We are also concerned about the prospect of renewed arms races at global and regional levels and the ongoing proliferation of conventional arms. All these threats are characterized by the fact that no national state is able to counter them effectively alone. There are no longer specific security risks for Germany or Poland, Hungary or France. In Europe today we find ourselves confronted with a new set of security challenges which do not stop at national borders. These dangers do not threaten specific member states of the European Union- they threaten us all. For this reason we have to find common answers to these challenges.

A number of European countries have decided to transform their Defence system in accordance with their individual or shared perception of threats.  Do you feel that there is sufficient coordination of the various European transformation doctrines?  Does this confront us with a problem of capacity coherence?

The European Union is characterised by a large diversity of historically rooted foreign policy and security traditions. The defence policies of the 27 member states are still displaying substantial differences, in areas such as strategic planning, transformation doctrine, equipment or leadership style. But there are more factors uniting than dividing us. Europe, as said above, faces common threats. And, the most important point, Europe shares a common set of European values. The European transformation doctrines may differ, but they are based on common principles. Europe stands for a security policy which is based on values, is not restricted to the military, is dedicated to the respect and further development of international law and acts multilaterally. These common convictions provide a good common base for a common European Security and Defence Policy the aim of which should not be the harmonisation of national transformation doctrines but the integration of the national armed forces into a common European Army.

How do you think the Trans-Atlantic relationship should evolve? What priorities would you set for this relationship?

The European Union is committed to the transatlantic relationship. As underlined in the European Security Strategy, this relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the EU and the US can be a formidable force for security in the world. The European Union's aim is an effective and balanced partnership with the US.  The transatlantic relationship evolves as the European Union evolves. NATO is the appropriate forum for transatlantic dialogue on security issues.

How should the NATO-EU defence relationship evolve? Should it remain limited to a mere quest for complementary capabilities (NATO Response Force-Battle Groups 1500, European Capabilities Action Plan-Prague Capabilities Commitment) or should it be reassessed in a more political manner?

The security risks, which the EU is facing today, are of different nature and require different responses. In case of an attack by armed forces of a third country against the territory of the EU, NATO will, for the majority of the member countries of the EU, continue to be the best suited instrument and guarantor of our common security. Apart from the scenario of an attack by armed forces there are, however, diverse other security risks and challenges which the EU has to deal with. If it is, for example, about destroying the financial networks of organized crime or international terrorism, securing the common European external borders, protecting critical infrastructures or coordinating the controls at the airports, it is the EU which has the appropriate means and possibilities and which is therefore required to act.

What relationship should we have with Russia today, within a context marked by a new "cold” era?

The Russian Federation is one of the most important partners for the European Union. A key priority of the European Union is to build a strong strategic partnership with Russia based on a solid foundation of mutual respect as well as on common interests and shared values. Russia is the largest neighbour of the union, brought even closer by the union’s 2004 and 2007 enlargements. The Security Strategy of the European Union highlights Russia as a key player in geopolitical and security terms at both the global and regional level.
The Russian Federation and the European Union should closely work together to combat threats to security, as terrorism, crime, illegal migration and trafficking in people as well as drugs. The European Union and Russia have an extensive dialogue on political issues around the world. With regard to the strategic importance of our cooperation it should be possible to overcome difficulties in specific questions such as for example Kosovo.

Which type of industrial and European platform can European cooperation be based on? Faced with global competition, should the process of creating major groupings for each sector be speeded up? Is it necessary to set a European objective for a minimum percentage of GDP to be allocated to Defence in order to boost this Defence Industrial Technological Base?

Whilst the European Union's member states individually spend a total sum of more than 170 billion Euros per year on defence, their ability to act is often limited by the absence of key capabilities. After the Kosovo war we were told by our American allies that we were spending almost half of their effort on defence but that the efficiency of our contribution was only ten percent.

This relative European inefficiency is partly due to the fact that we do not have a common European defence equipment market. This leads to much unnecessary duplication of procurement programmes. For example we have three parallel national systems of satellite based intelligence with different strengths and weaknesses. For humanitarian missions, natural disasters, the surveillance of our outside borders and for ESDP missions we have a common need for real time pictures, independent from weather and day time. The present situation, although costly, does not fulfil these requirements.

The same duplications exist in the field of command and control. What is needed is a common basic standard for the communications systems of military, police and disaster control services with different ways of coding. At present, we have five national telecommunications systems for running multinational operations. A common system would be less costly, more efficient and less risky for the personnel running these operations.

I only mention that there are twenty three parallel programmes for armoured vehicles, three new parallel programmes for combat aircraft and 89 European weapons programmes in comparison to only 27 in the United States.

Unnecessary cost is also caused by the fact that the borders between the member states which have been abolished in 1992 still exist in the field of defence. The total yearly cost of intra-community transfer was estimated of 3.16 billion Euros for 2003 including structural and procedural costs for industry and administration.

We also have to consider that multinational operations like Congo and Lebanon become more costly by the fact that due to the different equipment parallel chains of supply have to be organized. It would therefore be a big step forward if the equipment of the battle groups which are being established now would gradually be harmonized. This could begin with the systems of reconnaissance and telecommunications.

It is often said that our defence budgets should be increased and duplications between the European Union and NATO have to be avoided. This is certainly true. However we must point to the fact that the duplications between the member states are the main problem on our way to improve our capabilities and that we must improve our ability to spend better together. The increasingly expensive development of new military technology has already stimulated strong moves towards integration. Despite this, there is still much room for greater efficiency.

In this endeavour, there is a key role to be played by the European Defence Agency and the parallel efforts to create a common European security equipment market. Integration of European armed forces has long since begun. Numerous initiatives point in the right direction. For us Europeans it won't be possible to overcome our equipment deficits and capability gaps at a national level. We should try to get the best equipment possible for our common army.